This paper discusses the effects of pressure policies on offshore financial centers as well as their ability to enforce the compliance of those centers with anti-money laundering regulations. Offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of an investor's identity and the origin of his/her funds when pressure creates a sufficiently high risk of reputational harm to the investor. We show that such pressure policies harm both offshore and onshore investors and can benefit both the bank industry and tax administrations. We show that social optimal pressure policies are dichotomous decisions between no pressure at all and a pressure great enough to persuade offshore banks to comply. The delegation of pressure policies to onshore tax institutions may be inefficient. Deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center.
Introduction
O¤shore …nancial centers are often viewed as parasites that thrive by attracting tax cheaters and money-launderers. 12 However, sovereignty and democratic independence limit the ability of international bodies to intervene directly in the private economy of o¤shore …nancial centers. As noted by Abbott and Snidal (2000) , "diminution of sovereignty makes states reluctant to accept hard legalization, especially when it includes signi…cant levels of delegation". This di¢ culty is emphasized by the fact that bank secrecy represents an important asset of o¤shore …nancial centers. However, since the early 1990s, there have been multilateral e¤orts to address money laundering. Using the OECD list as its basis, the Leaders of the Group of Twenty recently pledged to take sanctions against tax havens that do not share information in the …ght against tax evasion and money laundering. 3 Many scholars are skeptical about the e¤ectiveness of this soft law practice as a means for disciplining o¤shore centers. A common argument often raised against this practice is that money laundering and bank secrecy are inextricably linked and combating …nancial crime can only be achieved by undermining con…dentiality laws (Antoine, 1999) . Other arguments are more speci…cally concerned with the lack of incentives to cooperate (Masciandaro, 2005 ).
According to FitzGerald (2004) , compliance with international regulations must be enforced especially on …nancial intermediaries, but while states may face international sanctions, there is no direct way to punish private sector actors, as they have no status under international law.
In the following, we take the position that successfully enforcing anti-money laundering standards relies on the existence of incentives to comply with these regulations. Rather than focus on the issue of national policymakers' compliance (Mascandiaro, 2005), we explore …nancial intermediaries'incentives to implement "know your customer" standards in order to identify and report dubious transactions. The reason is that this type of pressure hurts tax havens'
reputations in the eyes of governments and investors and may thus lead to capital withdrawals 1 Like Rose and Spiegel (2006), we de…ne o¤shore …nancial centers as jurisdictions that oversee a disproportionate level of …nancial activity by non-residents. 2 The IMF (2004) de…nes money-laundering as "a process in which assets obtained or generated by criminal activity are moved or concealed to obscure their link with the crime". 3 See the o¢ cial communiqué of the G20 London Summit (02/04/2009) at http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409 and other economic damage.
The potential loss of reputation for banks that exhibit lax behavior towards anti-money laundering practices is critical for analyzing o¤shore …nancial intermediaries'choices in complying with controlling rules. In that context, we ask the following questions: Can reputation loss provide enough incentive for banks to respond appropriately? Can compliance occur in spite of the existence of bank secrecy? To address these issues, we develop a model that endogenizes the strategic choice of an o¤shore …nancial center between lax and scrupulous attitudes towards controlling the origins of investments. In that context, we assume that bank secrecy provided by the o¤shore center is not only a possible channel for illegal money transfers but also as an opportunity for legal …nancial services coupled with tax advantages (Antoine, 1999; Desai et al., 2006 ). Therefore we consider a two-country two-…nancial center model with two classes of investors. Ordinary investors seek the best investment return opportunity but feel some (preference or geographical) distance from the o¤shore …nancial center. Criminal investors seek opaqueness and use the o¤shore banks'secrecy policy to launder money that is illegally obtained and may be used for illegal purposes (e.g. illegal drugs, terrorism). In this paper, we conform to the standards of existing literature by endogenizing interest rates and government taxes. As is customary in the literature about banking competition and tax competition, we assume that …nancial centers compete to attract investors and that governments independently set taxes on interest payments. In addition to those actions, national or international institutions must decide to exert pressure on the o¤shore bank and country, for instance, through blacklisting policies and pressure on individuals who invest o¤shore.
The …rst objective of the paper is to highlight the winners and losers of pressure policies. Our second objective is to establish the conditions under which the o¤shore …nancial center is convinced to comply with scrupulous monitoring of an investor's identity and the origins of his/her funds, and therefore has the incentives to implement adequate customer due-diligence/knowyour-customer investigations. The third objective is to analyze the e¢ ciency of the decision in terms of the e¤ort required to blacklist an o¤shore center and to campaign against o¤shore investment. The fourth objective is to discuss the delegation of pressure policies against onshore institutions like tax administrations. Indeed, because o¤shore centers are very likely to be tax havens, anti-money laundering actions exerted by onshore institutions may also be (partially) motivated by the desire to reduce tax losses. The …nal objective is to study the impact of …nancial integration, entry of o¤shore …nancial centers and o¤shore jurisdiction size on banks' compliance and money laundering.
Our results may be summarized as follows: First, we show that o¤shore banks and countries lose under pressure policies. More interestingly, this conclusion also applies for any (noncriminal) onshore investors, individually or in the aggregate. Surprisingly, the implementation of a pressure policy might not only increase tax revenue, but also raise aggregate pro…ts. This is because the pressure policy is not only likely to harm investors but also to weaken interbank competition. Second, we prove the existence of a pressure threshold above which the o¤shore …nancial center complies with international regulation. This threshold increases with the share of illegal investors and more interestingly with the degree of international …nancial integration.
To be e¤ective, this pressure policy should make ordinary investors incur a reputational harm that in monetary equivalent terms is larger than the banks'cost of monitoring investors.
Third, we derive the e¢ cient pressure policy that a central planner who maximizes net world surplus could implement to enforce o¤shore …nancial center compliance. We …nd that this planner would exert the needed pressure on o¤shore centers only if the social cost of money tra¢ cking exceeds a level that falls with deeper …nancial integration. Thus, deeper …nancial integration does not necessarily make money laundering more e¤ective. Finally, the pressure strategies determined by national or international institutions whose objectives are biased towards tax revenue can be equal to or di¤erent from the e¢ cient pressure strategies set by the above planner. We show that onshore institutions adopt e¢ cient pressure strategies if the social cost of criminality is high enough. Otherwise, if the cost of exerting pressure and the cost of criminality are small, the onshore institution adopts an ine¢ cient pressure policy, which is not enough to persuade the o¤shore …nancial center to comply. In that case, the …ght against money laundering chie ‡y serves to mitigate international banking and tax competition.
Finally, we analyze the case where several o¤shore jurisdictions compete to attract onshore investors. We show that the combination of pressure policies and o¤shore competition can help the onshore government to …ght criminality. In particular, o¤shore jurisdictions do not open international …nancial centers that are lax and launder money under the condition that their cost of setting up such a center is larger than the pro…ts that would obtain from the criminal investments only. We also study the impact of jurisdiction size on the incentives to open an o¤shore …nancial center. We show that a jurisdiction incurs an opportunity cost that is proportional to its size so that only a small jurisdiction is enticed to open an international …nancial center. Such small jurisdictions can nevertheless be disciplined by an appropriate pressure policy.
Related literature: This paper relates to the existing literature in public economics and money laundering in o¤shore …nancial centers. The public economics literature often discusses the harm of o¤shore …nancial centers applying tax competition models to o¤shore capital. As explained by Wilson and Wildasin (2004) and Cremer and Pestieau (2004) , much of the harm (resp., desirability) of tax competition hinges on the presence of benevolent (resp., Leviathan) governments. In particular, Slemrod and Wilson (2009) show that with the assumption of benevolent governments, the presence of tax havens worsens tax competition problems and that full or partial elimination of havens can improve welfare levels.
The present paper departs from the normative discussion of the desirability or harm of tax havens and instead focuses on the positive question about the compliance incentives of o¤shore banks and governments. Also, in contrast to the above literature, this paper makes more precise modeling of the banking sector by introducing interbank competition and capital holders' heterogeneity. Recently, Rose and Spiegel (2007) followed a similar approach in discussing a model with heterogeneous investors and (Stackelberg) competition between a domestic and o¤-shore bank. An important aspect highlighted in Spiegel and Rose (2007) is that the existence of o¤shore …nancial centers generates pro-competitive e¤ects on international banking activity.
Our paper takes this point a step further by analyzing how this bene…cial side e¤ect impacts the e¢ cient choice of a pressure policy and on governments'attitudes towards o¤shore centers.
Finally, the present paper also departs from the literature in its focus on money laundering.
Instead of focusing on …rms' avoidance of tax liabilities (e.g., Desai et al. 2006 ), our discussion concentrates on governments'…ght against criminal activities and the threat that money laundering creates. This threat has been prominently highlighted in the aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001 . In this direction, Masciandaro (2005 Masciandaro ( , 2006 shows that in the absence of international law, onshore governments can …ght criminal activity and reduce its cost by damaging the international reputation of o¤shore centers. Our model takes into account both features of tax competition and money laundering by introducing an ordinary and a criminal clientele.
The present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Sections 3 and 4 characterize the equilibrium in respect to o¤shore centers' compliance and noncompliance, Section 5 discusses the e¢ cient pressure policy and delegation to onshore institutions. Section 6 presents two extensions of the supply and size of o¤shore jurisdictions. Section 7 presents our conclusions.
Model
We consider a two-country two-…nancial-center model. Let the onshore institutions be subscripted by H (home) and the o¤shore ones by F (foreign). The timing is as follows: First, national or international institutions decide to exert pressure on the o¤shore bank and country, for instance, by blacklisting policies and pressuring individuals who invest o¤shore. Second, o¤shore …nancial centers decide whether to monitor investment deposits. The o¤shore and onshore …nancial centers and governments simultaneously set their interest and tax rates on deposits. The o¤shore and onshore …nancial centers and governments simultaneously set their interest and tax rates on deposits. 4 Third, investors choose the bank where they deposit their cash. Finally, the banks remunerate investors whereas investors pay their taxes on earned interests. We now describe each side of the …nancial centers.
Each …nancial center i (i = H; F ) collects funds from investors and o¤ers a risk-free interest rate r i . They invest those funds into risk-free assets that yield a given (world) rate of return r and make a pro…t on the intermediation margin r r i . Here we consider a small o¤shore …nancial center that competes with a domestic …nancial center to attract investors located in the domestic jurisdiction. We thus underline the fact that o¤shore …nancial centers often have 4 The timing of the tax and interest subgames does not qualitatively alter the results (see Picard and Pieretti 2009). very small populations and o¤er intermediation services predominantly to investors residing in large foreign economies. The o¤shore jurisdiction provides strict bank secrecy while the onshore center does not. It follows that the o¤shore …nancial center is more vulnerable to money laundering than other marketplaces where …nancial transactions are more transparent.
Like Rose and Spiegel (2007) , we consider that each jurisdiction contains only one bank. This allows us to focus on international …nancial competition. 5 Financial centers are also asked to scrupulously monitor investors' identities and money origins. Because our focus is on the e¤ect of the banks'monitoring of investors plays on the competition between …nancial centers and between governments, we simplify the monitoring technology by assuming that banks are able to discover the criminal identity and money origin of investors at a cost, c, proportional to the amount of monitored deposits. The main di¤erence between the onshore and o¤shore …nancial centers is that the onshore …nancial center is obliged by law to comply with the monitoring of investors whereas the o¤shore center has no such obligation. Instead, the latter should be encouraged to monitor investors by onshore governments or international institutions. Therefore, the o¤shore …nancial center has an additional decision variable, s 2 fm; og, where s = m denotes the scrupulous monitoring of the investors'money origins and s = o indicates a lax behavior on this issue.
Investors lend their capital to the …nancial centers. All investors reside in the home country H and are endowed with one unit of wealth that they deposit in the most advantageous …nancial center. The onshore economy contains S investors and the o¤shore …nancial center is assumed to have no local investors. Investors split into an ordinary and a criminal clientele.
On the one hand, we assume that there are (1 )S (4=5 < < On the other hand, the onshore country hosts S ordinary investors who invest money legally and thus favor the …nancial center that o¤ers the highest net rate of return. Independent of tax and return considerations, we suppose that ordinary investors incur a cost of moving assets abroad that mainly re ‡ects their reluctance to invest abroad. This reluctance may be explained by legal di¤erences and poor information about remote areas that diminish investors' con…dence in foreign …nancial centers. The reluctance may also re ‡ect the geographical distance between investors and foreign centers, a factor that increases the perceived or actual cost of monitoring their investments. 7 We therefore assume that ordinary investors are uniformly distributed along the unit segment according to their idiosyncratic reluctance to invest in the o¤shore banking sector. Consequently, we assume that the reluctance of an individual located at x (x 2 [0; 1]) is equal to the distance x that separates him from the o¤shore center's characteristics multiplied by a (constant) unit cost k. Improvements in technology that bolster global integration by creating international links between …nancial markets and facilitate the access to foreign …nancial centers tend to lower transaction and information costs. The harmonization of (international) …nance law also helps in reducing those costs. We thus interpret the 6 Underground or ethnic banking systems are remittance systems that operate outside of (or parallel to) traditional …nancial channels. They are becoming more and more popular today as ethnic diasporas grow (Blum et al. 1998). The most commonly known informal systems are the Chinese chit or chop system of East and Southeast Asia, the black market peso exchange system of Latin America, and the hawala system, with its o¤shoot the hundi system in South Asia (FitzGerald, 2004) . 7 Whereas Rose and Spiegel (2006) consider the heterogeneity of depositors in terms of individual wealth, we consider the heterogeneity of depositors in terms of their preferences for o¤shore …nancial centers. coe¢ cient k as measuring the degree of international …nancial integration. On the other hand, we consider that individuals seeking to conceal illegal money don't exhibit a preference for the home …nancial system. Furthermore, following Sharman (2004) , one dollar invested in a known place like the home country does not, all things being equal, correspond to the same amount being invested in an o¤shore center. O¤shoring money will cause investors to endure a premium that is likely to increase with the loss of reputation of the destination jurisdictions in which they deposit. In this vein, Sharman (2004, p.12) observes that, "investors tend to avoid or leave jurisdictions with bad reputations not only out of concern that their money will be misappropriated, but also because …rms risk harming their own reputations, as re ‡ected in their share prices." Accordingly, to take account of the quality of the o¤shore center's reputation, we introduce a parameter a, which represents the disutility that non-criminal investor incur by o¤shoring their money in a …nancial center that does not scrupulously monitor the origin of its deposits. This parameter encompasses various sources of utility losses that the ordinary investor associates with a deposit in a bad …nancial center (e.g., in terms of patriotism, a warm glow, tax-evasion tagging). For the sake of convenience, we label this parameter a as the "investor's reputational harm", although we do not intend to model any reputation game in this paper. Hence, the utility function of an investor located at x who deposits in jurisdiction i (i = H; F ) is assumed to be given by
In this de…nition,the investor's …rst option is to deposit in their home country, get the return r H and pay the tax t H per unit of deposit. The second option is to invest in the o¤shore …nancial center, get the return r F and pay the tax t F but incur a utility loss k x that depends on the investor's reluctance to invest in the o¤shore center. Finally, when the o¤shore center does not monitor, it is put under pressure by international organizations. This collective action may be achieved through campaigns in the media, new regulations, publications of reports and statis-tics, categorization of tax havens and strategies of "naming and shaming". 8 In the following we assume that investors who o¤shore their money are also stigmatized by the international pressure campaign and, in turn, incur a(n) (individual) reputational harm a. We …nally assume that min fr c k; r a kg > 0
So that it is always e¢ cient from the viewpoint of the o¤shore …nancial center to attract the most distant ordinary investor.
In this paper, the investor's reputational harm is an endogenous parameter that depends on the pressure that national and/or international institutions place on investors and the o¤shore …nancial center. Such institutions can put pressure on the o¤shore …nancial center by blacklisting them; they can put pressure on ordinary investors by informing them or campaigning about the risks of investing o¤shore, and by tagging and/or pursuing o¤shore investors, etc. We assume that the cost of exerting such a pressure is equal to C(a) = a. Finally, in accordance with standard tax competition literature, we assume that policy makers maximize their total tax proceeds, each one taking the tax of the other country as given.
We now derive the equilibrium deposit supplies, interest and tax rates when the o¤shore …nancial center either complies or does not comply with the scrupulous monitoring of investors.
Compliant o¤shore …nancial center
In this section, we derive the equilibrium of the sequential decisions of investors, banks and governments when each …nancial center decides to monitor the origin of invested funds and refuses to accept illicit money (s = m). In this case, deposits are supplied only by ordinary investors who do not incur any disutility from being associated to an o¤shore bank.
The deposit supplies are obtained as follows. If the o¤shore …nancial center monitors, criminals are unable to use the banking system to launder money while the share of ordinary investors lending their money in o¤shore …nancial center is determined by the marginal (ordinary) investor x F who is indi¤erent between both jurisdictions. We readily obtain that
As a result, the deposit supply functions are equal to
On the one hand, …nancial centers i (i = H; F ) select the interest rates that maximize their pro…ts i by taking as given the taxes and the rival's interest rate. That is, max
where c is the monitoring cost. On the other hand, each policy-maker i individually chooses her tax rate t i that maximizes her total tax proceed T i , taking the other country's tax as given. That is, max
responses of …nancial centers and governments are given by
As it is standard in the literature, interest and tax rates are strategic complement: an increase in one bank's interest rate triggers the rise of the other's bank interest rate. So do increases in tax rates. Accordingly, the interest rate di¤erential is equal to e r H e r F =
All taxes being equal, the onshore …nancial center sets a lower interest rate as it can take advantage of legal investors'preference for their home country. The equilibrium interest and tax rates are given by We now analyze the interesting case of a non compliant o¤shore …nancial center.
Lax o¤shore …nancial center
We now suppose that the o¤shore …nancial center does not monitor investors' identity and money origin (s = o). In this case some pressure is exerted on investors who incur a reputational loss a. We derive the equilibrium of the sequential decision of investors, banks and governments in the following way.
When the o¤shore …nancial center is lax, criminal investors are able to launder money in the o¤shore center. The share of legal money invested in each …nancial center is determined by the marginal (ordinary) investor x F who is indi¤erent between both jurisdictions. We readily compute
The deposit supply functions are equal to
Each …nancial center selects the interest rate that maximizes its own pro…t by taking as given the rival's rate. 10 That is, we have max where the superscript o denotes the equilibrium values under a lax o¤shore center and where
is the relative share of criminal investors (criminal investors versus legal ones). Interest rates are positive by (1) . At this equilibrium, the marginal investor who is indi¤erent between the …nancial centers is given by
which belongs to the interval [0; 1] if and only if
When a c is set above the highest boundary of this condition, investors'reputational loss a is so strong that ordinary investors avoid investing in the o¤shore center. By contrast, when a c is set below the lowest boundary, the monitoring cost is so high that the onshore bank sets an interest rate that is unattractive for any ordinary investor. This last set of conditions (2) determines an non empty interval and will be assumed from now for the sake of simplicity.
Note that both taxes are positive under conditions (2).
The equilibrium demands for deposits are then equal to
while banks'pro…ts and tax proceeds simply write as
We can make the following remarks about tax and interest rate di¤erentials.
Properties of tax and interest rates
On the one hand, the interest rate di¤erential is equal to
So, the o¤shore bank sets higher interest rates. There are two reasons for this result. First, the o¤shore bank must raise its interest rate to attract legal investors who feel some reluctance (in terms of geographical or characteristics distance). This e¤ect diminishes however as the …nancial market becomes more integrated (lower k). Second, the o¤shore bank must also set a higher interest rate than its competitor to attract legal investors who su¤er some reputational harm when they are associated to a lax o¤shore bank (a > 0).
On the other hand, the tax di¤erential between the onshore and o¤shore countries can be computed as
This tax di¤erential increases if investor's reputation is more strongly harmed by institutional pressures like blacklisting policy (larger a). The tax di¤erential also increases if the onshore …nancial center has a smaller compliance cost (smaller c) as this change allows the onshore center to increase its o¤ered interest rate and to attract more deposits. The tax di¤erential increases if the number of legal money investors rises (smaller ) as this raises the demand for onshore deposits. Finally, the tax di¤erential decreases with …nancial integration (smaller k).
Deeper …nancial integration reduces banks'intermediation markups, which in turn limits each country's opportunity to raise more tax on local investments.
It is important to note that, in contrast to the monitoring case and to tax competition literature (e.g. Kanbur and Keen, 1993) , the (large) onshore country does not always set the largest tax rate. Indeed, by (3), the onshore country sets a lower tax rate if and only if
where a lies between the boundaries in conditions (2) . The onshore country sets a lower tax rate if the investor's reputational harm is small enough compared to the monitoring cost. Higher monitoring costs oblige the onshore …nancial center to decrease the o¤ered interest, reducing its markup and its attractiveness to investors. The onshore country is then forced to cut its tax rate. Similarly, a fall in investor's reputational harm makes the o¤shore center more attractive and forces the onshore country to cut its tax rate.
We now explore the e¤ect on agents of an increase in the pressure on investors.
Winners and losers
In this section we show that the pressure on investors investing abroad does not only decrease criminality but it also softens bank competition, which increases bank pro…ts and tax revenue and decreases o¤shore and onshore investors wealth.
The investor's reputational harm a impacts on the deposit supplies, interest rates and taxes. Indeed, it can readily be shown that an increase in a entices investors to move their investments from the o¤shore …nancial center to the onshore one (dD
To resist the out ‡ow of investment, the o¤shore …nancial center raises its interest rate. By contrast, the onshore center can take advantage of a more captive set of investors and o¤ers a less advantageous interest rate (dr o H =da < 0 < dr o F =da). Since tax proceeds are congruent with pro…ts, the o¤shore policy maker then reacts to the out ‡ow of investors by relaxing her tax pressure whereas the onshore policy maker takes advantage of the repatriated investments by augmenting its tax pressure (dt
Hence, the o¤shore …nancial center and government are losers in this policy whereas the onshore center and governments are the gainers. It is then readily understood that the o¤shore …nancial lobbies and governments will be vividly opposed to the pressure policy whereas the onshore …nancial lobbies will be promoting it.
It is interesting to discuss the e¤ect of investor's reputational harm on the aggregate sur- 
where a is de…ned in expression (4). Therefore, the aggregate pro…t increases with the investor's reputational harm if and only if a > a. In this case, ordinary investors who return to the onshore …nancial center accept a lower interest rate because they do no longer feel any reputational harm and also because they avoid their idiosyncratic reluctance cost to invest o¤shore. As a consequence, the onshore center is able to realize larger intermediation markups; its pro…t rises at a faster pace than the fall of o¤shore pro…ts. It is remarkable that, by (4) ; that is, if the o¤shore country is a tax haven. This allows us to conclude that the aggregate pro…t increases with the investor's reputational harm if and only if the o¤shore country is a tax haven. Because pro…ts are congruent with taxes, the same conclusion applies to tax revenues. So, when the o¤shore country is a tax haven, banks and governments could extract more revenues in the aggregate by supporting pressure on investors' reputation. Of course, their problem is that cooperation on those issues is hard to obtain.
We now look at the aggregate welfare of ordinary investors. In contrast to banks and governments, ordinary investors are always harmed by an increase in a. The ordinary investors' aggregate surplus
includes the net return of onshore investment, the net return of o¤shore investment minus the reputational harm a from pressure to o¤shore investors and …nally the aggregate utility loss from their reluctance for the foreign center. Di¤erentiating this with respect to a yields In the aggregate, investors are thus negatively a¤ected by the larger reputational harm. This is because the harm on investor's reputation does not only destroy the value of o¤shore deposits but it also weakens the competition that disciplines the onshore center. Hence, any lobby representing ordinary onshore investors or onshore investors, or both groups shall be reluctant to an increase in pressure resulting in a higher investor's reputational harm.
We now study the condition under which the o¤shore …nancial center is enticed to shift from a lax behavior to a scrupulous monitoring. As stated in Section 2, criminality generates a social cost (1 )S whereas exerting pressure on o¤shore …nancial centers and investors has a cost C(a) = a. In addition to those costs, this paper has highlighted two additional costs, namely, the investor's reputational harm and the related weakening of banking competition. The purpose of this section is to discuss the balance between those costs. To be more precise, we here investigate about the e¢ cient level of pressure policy a. We …rst determine the pressure policy that entices o¤shore banks to monitor. We secondly adopt a normative perspective by asking for the e¢ cient pressure policy, which is the pressure that would maximize the welfare of both onshore and o¤shore countries. Finally, we present a positive discussion about a pressure policy that is delegated to onshore governmental agencies whose purposes are biased towards tax proceeds. The latter assumption is not too unrealistic as most OECD countries have designated their treasury and …nance ministries as lead participants in the Basel committees and in the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 11 .
Pressure policies and monitoring incentives
In this respect, the Economist (2001, p.66) wrote: "some suspect that the O.E.C.D. would like to use the …ght against money laundering to advance its parallel and controversial campaign against an activity it calls "unfair" tax competition [...]". In addition, the G20 leaders have recently agreed to stand ready to deploy sanctions to protect their public …nances (OCDE, 2010). For each case we discuss the impact of …nancial integration on the pressure policy.
O¤shore monitoring incentives
The o¤shore …nancial center has an incentive to monitor the investor's identity and money origin if its pro…t is larger under monitoring than under lax behavior. That is, if
is positive. For any a satisfying conditions (2), this happens if
where a F de…nes the threshold of investor's reputational harm above which the o¤shore …nancial center voluntarily complies and where a F satis…es condition (2). The o¤shore center should 11 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental organisation whose purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to combat money laundering and terrorist …nancing. Out of 34 member countries, the lead authority in FATF delegations has been granted to Treasury or Finance ministries/agencies for more than 16 countries including Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.A.. su¤er a su¢ cient demand loss (through larger a) to choose to monitor its investors. Note …rstly that the investor's reputational harm a should be set higher than the bank's monitoring cost c.
This re ‡ects the fact that the o¤shore center must be enticed to forego its pro…t on illegal money investors. If the number of illegal investors rises, the pressure exerted on ordinary investors should be even stronger (indeed, a F increases with ). Note secondly that the o¤shore center is more likely to monitor its investors for higher degree of international …nancial integration (smaller k). Indeed, …nancial integration hurts more the lax o¤shore center because the latter must cut its intermediation margin not only on the ordinary investors but also on the captive criminal ones.
E¢ cient pressure strategies
We now discuss the optimal pressure exerted by a benevolent social planner who maximizes an objective that encompasses the economic surplus of both countries and the criminality damage in the onshore country as follows:
where a is the social cost of exerting pressure a and where (1 ) S is the social cost attached to the use of the banking system to criminal activity. The latter cost vanishes when the o¤shore …nancial center monitors its investors.
The economic surplus can readily be computed given that the total mass of ordinary investors is constant and equal to S. For every unit of investment, the investor, the bank and the government share the risk-free rate interest r. Indeed, the investor earns r i t i , the bank r r i and the government t i , which all add up to r. In addition, an o¤shore investor su¤ers from reputational losses from the pressure a and from the reluctance kx for investing in the o¤shore center. The banks incur the cost c when they monitor their investors. Therefore, if the planner exerts a su¢ cient pressure to entice the o¤shore …nancial center to monitor (a a F ), the above objective writes as
c S a
This function obviously decreases in a. If the planner exerts a too low pressure a (0 a < a F ), the o¤shore center does not monitor. The objective writes as Di¤erentiating this objective by a, we get
where the square bracket in this expression is negative under a < a F and < 1=4. Hence, the economic surplus decreases with stronger pressure and investor's reputational loss a. As mentioned above, the investor's reputational loss does not only destroy value for o¤shore investors but it also reduces the onshore's investor surplus through the e¤ect of relaxing the competition for the bene…t of the onshore …nancial center.
Because both objectives decrease in a on their respective supports, the planner's optimal pressure strategy is to set the smallest value of a on each support. As a result the planner sets
Given that the objective W o decreases in we can infer the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold e for the social cost of criminality such that the social planner exerts no pressure if < e and exerts the pressure a = a F otherwise.
In her decision, the planner balances the social cost of criminality against the cost of reduced competition. The unexpected property of our model is the dichotomy in the pressure policy.
Such a dichotomy stems from the fact that o¤shore banks are homogeneous and make the same monitoring choices at a = a F and the facts that there the welfare objective has a jump at a = a F and falls in the ranges above and below this threshold. The reader will note that such a dichotomy is robust to alternative assumptions. For instance, if banks were heterogeneous with respect to their monitoring costs, they would nevertheless need to coordinate their monitoring decisions to a same threshold because the investors'reputation harm is attributed to the …nan-cial center rather than to any single bank. Also, if criminals were heterogeneous with respect to their preferences to launder money abroad, the total investment supply in o¤shore banks would still di¤er under monitoring and lax behaviors and would still trigger a dichotomous change in the o¤shore banks'monitoring decisions. Finally, the fact that welfare objective decreases with the pressure policy emanates from the direct cost that the pressure policy imposes on the government and from the indirect cost that the reputation harm imposes on both investors and banks. The pressure policy is a harm on investors, which would be suppressed in the absence of criminality. Changes in the speci…cation of the investors'supply functions would not alter such a property.
We now turn to the issue of …nancial integration. How does the pressure policy change when di¤erentiation between …nancial centers falls (smaller k)? Di¤erentiating totally the equality
where < 1=4. This expression re ‡ects the opposite e¤ects of …nancial integration on the direct cost of pressure policies and the economic ine¢ ciency they generate. On the one hand the …rst term of the latter expression shows the e¤ect of …nancial integration on the cost of the pressure policy, a F . As mentioned earlier, a fall in k decreases the pro…t of the o¤shore …nancial center more in the lax scenario than in the monitoring case. As a consequence, the threshold a F falls with smaller k so that …nancial integration increases the e¤ectiveness of the pressure policy.
The planner therefore needs to exert a weaker pressure to entice the o¤shore bank to comply to then monitoring their investors. This e¤ect is naturally more important for higher cost of exerting pressure, . On the other hand, the second term in the last expression re ‡ects the e¤ect of …nancial integration on the economic surplus generated by the whole banking sector when the o¤shore bank is lax. In particular, a fall in k decreases the number of onshore investors and therefore the bank's cost of monitoring. This cost saving in the banking industry generates an economic surplus that increases with weaker pressure policies. Hence, the planner has an incentive to refrain from exerting a pressure policy and to exert the pressure policy a F for higher costs of criminality . To sum up, …nancial integration makes the pressure policy more e¤ective but more harmful for the e¢ ciency of the banking sector. Which e¤ect dominates depends on the cost of exerting pressure, . Indeed,
The threshold b is more likely to be positive if the economy includes fewer criminals (smaller ).
Proposition 2 As …nancial markets integrate (smaller k), the social planner is more likely to entice the o¤shore bank to monitor by exerting the pressure a = a F if and only if > b .
This proposition also quali…es the usual claim stating that …nancial globalization fosters criminality. We have here shown that deeper …nancial integration encourages compliance by o¤shore centers. It furthermore entices the social planner to use this pressure when the cost of …nancial criminality is high enough compared to the cost of reducing interbank competition.
Under this condition, …nancial globalization reduces …nancial criminality.
The present analysis has relied on the unlikely existence of a social planner that aggregates the interests of all (non-criminal) participants in the economy. As stated above, pressure on o¤shore centers is discussed, negociated and then implemented by international bodies which comprise delegation of various member states whose objectives might be biased towards tax revenues. This is the topic of the next section.
Delegating pressure policies to an onshore agency
We now discuss the case where the decision on the pressure policy is delegated to the onshore tax agency. Such a delegation is indeed likely to arise because governments have a …scal interest in eliminating fraud and because tax administrations are equipped with audit instruments to check/threaten tax payers who possess o¤shore bank accounts. In addition since onshore tax proceeds are aligned with onshore pro…ts, such a delegation can readily get the support of the onshore banks'lobby. We here show how such a delegation strategy can be socially ine¢ cient.
In this context, we assume that the onshore institution maximizes the tax proceed minus the social cost of criminality net of the cost of the pressure policy, which is equal to o (a; ) =
a if a a F . We now derive the optimal pressure policy chosen by this institution.
Let us …rst look at the case where the o¤shore …nancial center is enticed to monitor its investors (a a F ). Then, neither the onshore tax proceeds nor the criminality level depend on the level of the pressure policy a. As a result, the onshore institution optimally sets a = a F .
Let us then consider the case where the o¤shore …nancial center is not enticed to monitor its investors (a < a F ). As noted in Section 4.2, the onshore tax proceeds T a is a convex function of a, the optimal pressure policy on the interval [0; a F ) must be either a = 0 or a = a F ", where " > 0 is in…nitely small.
The second pressure policy, a = a F "; is explained by the fact that the onshore institution (as well as the onshore banks) has an incentive to deter ordinary investors from o¤shoring their money. Such a deterrence strategy increases investors'demand for the onshore center and raises onshore pro…ts and taxes. In addition, the onshore institution also has an incentive to entice illegal money investors to go to the o¤shore bank. Indeed, because the o¤shore bank will take advantage of this captive clientele, it will be able to lower its o¤ered interest rates so that the demand for the onshore bank will be boosted. The following proposition presents a full characterization of the pressure policy.Let
Proposition 3 The optimal pressure policy of the onshore institution is to implement (i) no pressure if > and < 2 ( ),
(ii) the pressure policy a = a F " if < and < 1 and (iii) the pressure policy a = a F if > max f 1 ; 2 ( )g
Proof. See Appendix A.
Insert Figure 1 here Figure 1 illustrates the optimal pressure policy for parameters ( ; ). According to this Finally, it implements a pressure policy that eliminates criminality through active monitoring by the o¤shore …nancial center if the social cost of criminality is high enough.
The pressure policy of the onshore institution is not fully aligned with the social planner's choice. In particular, if the cost of exerting pressure and the cost of criminality are small enough, the onshore organization exerts a pressure but never to the point where the o¤shore …nancial center monitors. It rather uses the pressure policy to relax interbank competition and repatriate investments back to the onshore bank. This interesting result highlights the impact of the tax repatriation motives in the …ght against money-laundering. Such motives can indeed eliminate the incentives to have o¤shore …nancial centers actually comply with "know-yourcustomer" and reporting regulations. Hence, such a pressure policy, presented under the label of a …ght against criminality, may in fact be diverted to the objective of tax collection, with the blessing of onshore …nancial centers.
The result stated in Proposition 3 relies on the same dichotomy and discontinuity properties as discussed for Proposition 1. A main di¤erence is that the onshore tax revenue is an increasing and convex function of the pressure policy. As a result, the tax agency may …nd it pro…table to push its pressure level up as long as the o¤shore …nancial center chooses a lax behavior. Such a convexity property stems from the existence of increasing returns from the pressure policy a.
Indeed, a rise in a does not only entice onshore investors to rappatriate their investment from abroad but it also decreases their claims on onshore interest payments. So, the pressure policy raises (multiplicatively) both the number of onshore investors and the mark-ups and taxes that onshore …nancial center and government can impose.
How does this pressure policy change when …nancial integration increases (smaller k)? It is …rstly readily seen that decreases to zero and becomes negative as k falls. The intuition is that smaller di¤erentiation between …nancial markets does not only reduce pro…ts but also tax proceeds. So, the onshore institution is less enticed to exert pressure for tax motives. Secondly, the threshold 1 also falls to zero with smaller k. Those two properties imply that the set of parameters for which the tax agency sets the ine¢ cient pressure policy a = a F " shrinks as k falls. Financial integration therefore diminishes the incentives for the tax agency to set such an ine¢ cient pressure policy.
O¤shore jurisdiction supply and size
In this section we discuss the impact of pressure policies on the size and supply of o¤shore jurisdictions. We highlight several facts. First, large jurisdictions are served by only a small set (if not a singleton) of dominant o¤shore centers and those jurisdictions have small populations. For example, the Cayman Islands and the Bahamas host the largest banking services directed towards U.S. clients, 12 Jersey and Guernsey towards British customers, Hong Kong towards various other Southeast Asian countries, Luxembourg towards its neighboring countries Germany, France and Belgium, Liechtenstein towards Germany, etc. Two reasons underlie the small number of o¤shore jurisdictions hosting an active international …nancial center. The …rst is that there seems to be strong legal and cultural product di¤erentiation according to the 12 The Cayman Islands host more than 40% of o¤shore assets in 2001 according to Oral et al. (2005) .
onshore jurisdiction that is served. Many o¤shore jurisdictions have historical and legislative links with their o¤shore jurisdictions. Legislative links help promote and adapt advantageous …nancial legislation in the o¤shore jurisdictions while historical or jurisdictional links help appease international relations with onshore jurisdictions. 13 On the other hand, because o¤shore services often lack product di¤erentiation, competition is …erce amongst the o¤shore jurisdictions and …nancial centers that want to serve the same onshore customers. As a result, many jurisdictions have incentives to forgo establishing or maintaining their legal advantages in order to limit the o¤shore centers that serve the same class of customers. As shown by the cases of Haifa and Cuba, who were replaced by Beirut and the Bahamas after World War II (Palan, 1998) , changes in o¤shore dominance can be dramatic.
In this section, we extend the previous model to discuss the economic impact of a large supply of o¤shore jurisdictions on pressure policies. We then study the e¤ect that the size of the o¤shore jurisdiction has.
Supply of o¤shore centers
We now study the issue of the supply of o¤shore centers. When many o¤shore centers compete for clientele from the same onshore center, the o¤shore …nancial market is rarely pro…table.
The onshore government eliminates criminal investments by preempting pro…table activity in the o¤shore banking market.
We assume that the o¤shore jurisdictions l = 1; 2; :::; N are present in the international …nancial market that is considered by onshore investors. All o¤shore banks make their monitoring decisions and then governments and …nancial centers make their decisions over tax and interest rates. The di¢ culty of the present analysis lies in combining simultaneous competition over interest and tax rates with the presence of two groups of perfectly mobile ordinary and criminal investors. While the formal analysis is presented in the Appendix, we present here the main results.
Both o¤shore governments and banks play a Bertrand competition game in terms of tax 13 For instance, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, Jersey, Gernsey, and the Netherlands Antilles are or have been Overseas Territories or Crown Dependencies of the U.K, the Netherlands or the U.S.A.. Luxembourg and Monaco's law were inspired by French law and recently updated to E.U. legislation. Monaco's military defense is the responsibility of France. Liechtenstein's diplomacy is delegated to Switzerland. and interest rates. Each o¤shore …nancial center l, has an incentive to attract onshore ordinary investors by o¤ering the highest return net of tax or reputation loss; that is, either r l t l when it monitors or r l t l a when it is lax. They also have incentives to attract criminal investors who incur no reputation losses. Similarly, the o¤shore jurisdiction l also has incentives to attract investors by diminishing its tax rate. The equilibrium interest and tax rates depend on the con…gurations of the set of monitoring decisions. Jurisdictions o¤er their maximal interest rates and set their taxes to zero in all con…gurations, except where only a single compliant or a single lax jurisdiction exists. Such equilibria are reminiscent of the tax and banking competition literature that emphasizes the possibility of a race to the bottom in taxes and intermediation margins. In the presence of lax centers, criminal deposits still exist but they bene…t neither o¤shore lax banks nor their jurisdictions.
In con…gurations where there is only one center in the group of compliant or lax centers, the e¤ect of competition is less dramatic. In both cases there will be pro…t to share between this …nancial center and its government. On the one hand, if there is only one monitoring center, this center is pro…table and yields tax revenues if c < a. Indeed, the monitoring center is able to o¤er the interest rate r a, which cannot be overbidden by lax centers even though they must set their highest rate at r because of the competitive pressure amongst themselves. The monitoring jurisdiction generates the following pro…t from its margin a c between the lax centers'reputational harm and its own monitoring cost:
This strategy is pro…table only if c < a. On the other hand, if only one lax center exists, this center may generate the value
by targeting only on criminal investors, whereas it can generate the value
by attracting both criminal and ordinary investors, which is pro…table only if c > a. In the Appendix we determine the con…gurations of monitoring decisions that are Nash equilibria.
From this analysis, we can infer that a large supply of o¤shore centers is detrimental for jurisdictions and banks. In the absence of o¤shore product di¤erentiation, competition signi…cantly reduces o¤shore pro…ts and tax revenues. It also reduces onshore pro…ts and tax revenues.
Competition does not however prevent o¤shore banks from o¤ering investment prospects for criminals so that pressure policies are ine¤ective.
Pressure policies nevertheless become e¤ective when o¤shore jurisdictions incur costs in establishing and maintaining their international …nancial centers. Such costs are indeed not negligible. International …nancial centers require supervisory bodies and auditing institutions.
Criminals also need the trust in and the reliability of o¤shore bank institutions and products.
In addition, o¤shore jurisdictions need to design appropriate laws for …nancial products and institutions, pay for utilities, o¢ ces, supplies, and advertising for their own center. According Proof. See Appendix B.
As a result, the combination of pressure policies and o¤shore competition helps the onshore government to …ght criminality. As a case in point, the pressure policy required to hinder criminals'investments in a competitive o¤shore market is smaller than the pressure policy a F that was needed to eliminate criminal deposits in an o¤shore monopoly (a F N > a F ).
We conclude this discussion with two observations. First, the cost of setting up an international …nancial center also has implications for the entry of o¤shore jurisdictions in the international …nancial market. Indeed, because of o¤shore banking competition, only one or a few o¤shore jurisdictions and …nancial centers may be enticed to enter and/or survive. As a result, incumbent o¤shore jurisdictions may bene…t from …rst-mover advantage, as potential entrant jurisdictions may prefer not to sink the initial cost of establishing an international …-nancial center. Similarly, tacit collusion amongst the few o¤shore jurisdictions may help sustain higher taxes and lower net returns for investors. In this case, the onshore government must …ght criminality in the same manner as the monopoly o¤shore jurisdiction discussed in the previous sections.
Second, although competition in the o¤shore banking market increases investors'returns, it harms the onshore banking industry and diminishes tax proceeds. Because of the larger investors' surplus, a benevolent social planner (who maximizes the economic surplus of all countries minus criminality damage in the onshore country) is likely to choose a policy promoting an appropriate pressure policy and the entry of many o¤shore …nancial centers. In contrast, when the policy towards o¤shore centers is delegated to the onshore tax agency, the latter agency is likely to choose a policy promoting the concentration of the o¤shore banking sector in a single jurisdiction and that sets the ine¢ cient pressure level a F ".
We now turn to the issue of the impact of jurisdictional size on pressure policies.
O¤shore jurisdiction size
We now clarify the role of an o¤shore jurisdiction's size on its choice to host an o¤shore international …nance center. Our main argument is that each o¤shore jurisdiction and …nancial center trades o¤ the bene…ts of targeting local investors and attracting foreign investors. In most o¤shore jurisdictions, local investors represent a small less-informed and less mobile group. In opening an international …nancial center, each jurisdiction incurs an opportunity cost equal to the amount of taxes lost on local investors. As a result, a smaller jurisdiction is more likely to open an o¤shore international …nancial center because the smaller group of local investors yields a smaller opportunity cost.
To develop this point, we assume a single o¤shore center that hosts a mass L F Sl F of local homogenous investors who do not invest abroad and, naturally, are not harmed by the pressure policy. They invest their money in their local banking system only if they get a positive net return r F t F . As before, the o¤shore …nancial center chooses its monitoring strategy and then both onshore and o¤shore …nancial centers and jurisdictions independently set their interest and tax rates (r i ; t i ), i = H; F .
The presence of local investors changes the investment supply of the o¤shore …nancial center and therefore alters the latter's strategy. To attract onshore investors, the o¤shore …nancial center must raise its interest rates and forgo the pro…ts on local investors. Similarly, the o¤shore government attracts onshore investors by cutting their tax rates and forgoing the tax revenues on local investors. Let r and t denote the tupples (r H ; r F ) and (t H ; t F ). Let i (r; t)
and T i (r; t) be the pro…ts and tax revenues if the o¤shore center attracts onshore ordinary investors. Let A F (r; t) and T A F (r; t) de…ne the o¤shore center's pro…ts and tax revenues under autarky when it does not attract any international investors. Autarkic pro…ts and tax revenues increase with the mass of o¤shore local investors. The equilibrium is de…ned as the Nash equilibrium of the tax and interest rate games such that r H = arg max r H H (r H ; r F ; t ); r F = arg max r F f F (r H ; r F ; t ); A F (r H ; r F ; t )g, t H = arg max t H T H (r ; t H ; t F ) and t F = arg max t F fT F (r ; t H ; t F ); T A F (r ; t H ; t F )g. If the number of local investors is small, banks and governments are able to set low interest rates and high enough tax rates so that they can obtain a pro…t higher with ordinary investors than without them. For instance, under monitoring behavior, the o¤shore equilibrium interest and tax rates are then given
As is apparent, a larger mass of local investors l F prevents the o¤shore banks from raising their interest rate while enticing the o¤shore government to raise more taxes. Therefore, o¤shore jurisdictions with larger groups of local investors are weaker competitors and may avoid opening an o¤shore international …nancial center. The same conclusion holds under lax behavior. We then get the following proposition:
Proposition 5 There exist two numbers of local investors l 
Conclusion
International and national institutions pressure o¤shore …nancial centers and their clients to comply with anti-money laundering regulations. Many observers consider such a soft-law practice as ine¢ cient in combating money laundering by …nancial institutions. They claim that money laundering and bank secrecy are inextricably linked and that only by undermining con…dentiality laws can the …ght against …nancial crime be achieved. In this paper, we discuss such pressure policies and assess their impact on money laundering. We employ a two-country two-…nancial center model with ordinary and criminal investors. Our modeling strategy …ts with the standards of the economic literature not only in allowing interbank competition, but also by modeling the tax competition between the onshore and o¤shore …nancial centers. This modeling strategy allows us to discuss the winners and losers of such pressure policies in a clear-cut way. We show that aggregate pro…t and tax revenues can increase under the e¤ect of pressure policies because such policies can reduce interbank and tax competition. In addition, we demonstrate that o¤shore banks will comply with scrupulous monitoring of investors'identities and the origin of their funds when the pressure has the potential to create su¢ cient harm to an investor's reputation. We …nd that an e¢ cient pressure policy is dichotomous in the sense that a social planner chooses zero pressure or just enough pressure for compliance. We also show that the implementation of pressure policies by an onshore tax institution may be ine¢ cient as they can be biased towards the banking sector's pro…ts and can therefore never eliminate criminal activity. Finally, we qualify the claim stating that deeper …nancial integration fosters …nancial criminality. In this model, …nancial integration reduces …nancial criminality. Such results are not qualitatively altered by the presence of many o¤shore jurisdictions or the fact that the latter host a small group of local investors. Consider …rst that < . Then, the optimal pressure is a = a
and a = a F otherwise (see Figure 2 ). This situation arises if and only if
which simpli…es to the expression shown in the text. Accordingly, we get the optimal pressure a = a F " if < 1 and a = a F if 1 .
Consider secondly that > so that the optimal pressure is a = 0 if
and a = a F otherwise (see Figure 3) . That is, if
This is equivalent to
, which simpli…es to the expression shown in the text. Therefore, the pressure policy is a = 0 if < 2 , a = a F if > 2 . If = 2 , then a 2 f0; a F g. Since the latter case has a zero measure in the set of parameters ( ; ), we omit it in the proposition.
Appendix B: O¤shore jurisdiction supply
To support the above analysis, we prove the following propositions. We assume that o¤shore jurisdictions l = 1; 2; :::; N are present in the international …nancial market. All o¤shore banks make their monitoring decisions and then governments and …nancial centers make simultaneous decisions over tax and interest rates. We solve this game by backward induction and derive the sub-game perfect equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 6
In the tax and interest rate sub-game, the o¤shore …nancial centers l = f1; 2; :::N g o¤er net interest rates r l t l no lower than r c or r a. Either o¤shore jurisdictions collect no tax revenues or they share a banking pro…t that is not larger than max For a set of monitoring decisions s, both o¤shore governments and …nancial centers play a
Bertrand competition game in terms of tax and interest rates. On the one hand, for a given set of tax rates t = (t 1 ; :::; t N ), the o¤shore center l attracts the onshore ordinary investors only if it can o¤er the highest return net of tax or reputation loss; that is, either r l t l when it monitors or r l t l a when it is lax. Each o¤shore …nancial center overbids the interest rate of other o¤shore centers in order to become more attractive and reap the full demand of international investors. Lax …nancial centers are able raise their interest rates up to r whereas monitoring centers are able to raise them only up to r c without making a loss. On the other hand, for a given set of interest rates r = (r 1 ; :::; r N ), o¤shore jurisdictions are also enticed to attract investors by diminishing their tax rates. Each o¤shore government has incentives to undercut its rival until its tax rate falls to zero. Let us denote the net return o¤ered by the most attractive o¤shore …nancial center by n F r F t F F min l (r l t l l ) where l = 0 if l is monitoring and l = a if l is lax.
Second, the onshore institutions set their optimal interest and tax rates given the o¤shore institutions' decisions. [r c + k n F ]. The onshore …nancial center and jurisdiction o¤er a net interest rate (net of tax and reputation harm) to investors that is equal to e n H (n F ) = e r H (n F ) e t H (n F ) = n F . The onshore pro…t and tax revenues are then equal to e H (n F ) = e T H (n F )
We are now equipped to derive and discuss the interest and tax sub-game equilibrium. First, if all o¤shore centers monitor, s = (m; :::; m), all o¤shore jurisdictions and …nancial centers o¤er their maximal interest rate r c and set their taxes to zero. The onshore jurisdiction and …nancial center set a net interest rate equal to e n H (r c) and makes pro…ts and tax revenues equal to e H (r c) = e T H (r c) = 
S. In any con…guration, the maximal pro…t that a jurisdiction can obtain is equal to max F N ; F N if c > a, and F 1 if c < a.
We can now turn to the o¤shore banks'monitoring decisions s = (s 1 ; :::; s N ). is not an equilibrium because any single lax …nancial center can get a share of the positive pro…t 
Investors'supplies are given by
Pro…ts and tax revenues are given by
In this no-autarky equilibrium, the o¤shore bank decides to monitor if its pro…t F is greater under monitoring than lax behavior. Using the above values, one gets the condition a > a F = c + 3k , which is independent of l F . At this value there exists a jump in the welfare objective of a central planner so that Proposition 1 applies. Under a lax behavior where a < a F , T F is again a convex, increasing function of a, which implies that Proposition 3 applies.
To be a no-autarky equilibrium, this equibrium must additionally yield higher pro…ts and tax revenues than the pro…ts and tax revenues obtained when o¤shore …nancial center and government target their local investors. We now consider possible deviation of the o¤shore center towards autarky. Let us consider an o¤shore center with interest and tax rates (r F ; t F ).
On the one hand, suppose that the o¤shore …nancial center reduces its interest rate and its net return so that it foregoes the international investors. towards this aim, it sets the lowest possible interest rate r F = t F . This action decreases its pro…t by an amount equal to
S (l F + F ) (r c F t F ) which is positive if 24k 2 ( F + l F ) 2 ( F + l F ) k (25r 11c 22k + 11 F 14c F ) + (c + 2k On the other hand, suppose that the o¤shore government increases its tax and and reduces the net return in its jurisdiction so that it also foregoes the international investors. towards this aim, it sets the highest possible tax t F = r F . This action also decreases its tax revenues by an amount equal to
Because r F + t F = r c F , this condition is equivalent to condition (7) . A su¢ cient condition is also l F < l Similarly, the government prefers to not reduce its tax t F and and not to raise its net return to attract onshore investors because the tax revenue di¤erential
is always negative for t F < t 
